

*cont.*

ICAPS COMMENTS ON STATE RECOMMENDATIONS (NSC 50)

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation 1

That ICAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be being composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not "representing" the agency, and be headed by a chief who ~~will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC.~~ That ICAPS serve as the Secretariat for the IAC.

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs in this recommendation if rewritten as indicated above (omitting the words struck out and inserting the words underlined).

Comments

This recommendation describes the present situation as regards the Chief of ICAPS and the member from the Department of State. The "joint staff" concept should be clearly established in the case of the members contributed by the military departments. The proposal that the Chief of ICAPS should serve as the Executive Secretary of the IAC is incompatible with his relationship, as a staff officer, to the DCI. The Secretariat concept, however, involves the essential staff work for promoting efficiency at the IAC meetings. An "Executive Secretary" would be more responsible to the IAC than to the DCI.

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation 2

That matters of coordination be referred to ICAPS for study and recommendation by the DCI, or through the DCI by the IAC, but that ICAPS itself may submit to the DCI, or through the DCI to the IAC, recommendations which it considers appropriate for consideration.

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation.

Comments

This recommendation accurately describes a relationship where ICAPS serves the DCI as a part of his staff.

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation 3

That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC or by its members.

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs in this recommendation if rewritten as indicated.

Comments

The phrase added to the recommendation contributes elasticity. This recommendation is sound, but may need clarification due to the fact that in paragraph 3 of his discussion, Mr. Armstrong states that the Standing Committee can act in the same fashion as the NSC consultants. If this concept is accepted, it may indicate that higher level representatives are desired on the Standing Committee, and the question would be raised as to whether ICAPS is to function on the level of the NSC staff or on the level of the NSC consultants. If ICAPS continues its present functions as outlined in the recommendation, it would serve on both levels. Is this all right with Mr. Armstrong?

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

*Classified*

Recommendations 1j and 1k

That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs (primarily through the Estimates Division) whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:

*of substance, not as filler.*

- a. CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all US foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;

*Information to CIA from State?*

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs in this recommendation if rewritten as indicated.

*ORE*

Comments

The reference to "Estimates Division" is struck out as this raises a matter of the internal organization of CIA. The word "activities" is struck out in order to avoid inclusion of information collecting activities in the subject matter of this paragraph, which is intended to be devoted to the coordination of research programs. This recommendation will strengthen the system so that CIA will be the acknowledged reservoir of all US foreign intelligence.

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation 4b

CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation; *+ intelligence* *applicable*

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation, subject to the understanding that the phrase "subject to overall departmental regulation" refers only to security regulations. *0186*

Comments

The adoption of this strengthened concept would necessitate the revision of NSCID Number 1 where it is specified that by departmental permission we may see only "intelligence materials." Of course the words "subject to overall departmental regulations" need some clarification. Do they refer only to "security" regulations?

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation *lc*

CIA will recognize that it should have active liaison responsibility to other agencies as well as receiving liaison from those agencies;

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs in this recommendation.

Comments

Under the existing situation, working level liaison is reasonably complete. What State wants here is that topside CIA personnel, particularly members of ICAPS, should "come around" to see agency operations and discuss frankly and freely any problems with the agency personnel.

*Approved - recommended with...*

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Recommendation <sup>hd</sup>

CIA will effect coordination as much by positive action in stimulating appropriate intelligence effort as by negative action in preventing undesirable duplications;

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs in this recommendation.

07:15

Comment

The principle expressed here is good, but the big question is whether the Departments will accept "positive action" on the part of CIA.

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

*From the [unclear]*

Recommendation by

CIA will recognize that requests for intelligence other than national intelligence, as defined, shall be forwarded for action to the agencies in accordance with established allocations and existing programs;

*modified*

Concurrence

ICAPS does not concur with this recommendation.

*OK*

Comments

Requests from the President, the National Security Council, and the JCS do not come earmarked "national" or "Departmental," and do not fit into "existing programs." The whole question of original production effort by CIA is involved in this recommendation. State has already agreed to the contents of DCI 3/1 and DCI 3/2 which recognize the production responsibilities of CIA and of the agencies. ICAPS should determine with accuracy if these directives are being implemented in proper fashion or if they need modification as contended by ORE.

*AS-12 1+3*

I. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

*Confidential*

Recommendation *lf*

CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies.

Concurrence

ICAPS does not concur with this recommendation.

*CKE*

Comments

This is not a "coordination" problem. It is obviously impossible for CIA to accept such a blanket commitment as this. Heretofore CIA has been able to provide some financial assistance to some agencies, but even that cannot be continued much longer.

*Coordination does not require physical or financial assistance*

*Further Study*

II. PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Recommendations 1 and 1a

That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

- a. That national intelligence applies ~~only~~<sup>only</sup> to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;

*Applying intelligence method  
if there is a preference of info  
CIA's that info is  
in substance*

Concurrence

ICAPS does not concur with this recommendation.

Comments

This is the fundamental point at issue. ONE contends that national intelligence cannot be defined exclusively in terms of being interdepartmental in substance, but should be defined in terms of the purpose for which it is produced and the levels at which it is to be used.

The current accepted definition, however, is:

"National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment."

The use of the word "only" in 1(a) is too restrictive for the demands made upon CIA.

## II. PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

### Recommendation 1b

That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;

### Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation, subject to the understanding that the obligation to avoid duplication is a mutual obligation, binding upon all the IAC agencies.

### Comments

This is a noble goal which must be kept in mind by all the IAC agencies. Actually CIA is not so chargeable with the crime of duplication as are some of the IAC agencies which are reluctant to give up work they are doing in fields not of primary interest. Perhaps acceptance of this recommendation could be used later as a basis for a clearer delineation of the responsibilities of the various IAC agencies.

If there really is a "free <sup>flow</sup> ~~plan~~" of information, CIA has and can use such departmental contributions. This factor is especially important in meeting deadlines. Intradepartmental demands upon the intelligence agencies often prevent <sup>their</sup> ~~the~~ supplying contributions to meet CIA deadlines.

II. PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Recommendation 1c

That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate agencies.

Concurrence

ICAPS does not concur with this recommendation.

Comments

There are many occasions other than "crisis situations" when CIA is forced to prepare national estimates against a deadline not permitting consultation with appropriate agencies. These "urgent" and "exceptional" demands are covered by DCI 3/1 as are the very few "crisis" situations. There are other occasions when the identity of the originator of the request, his purpose in making the request, and the nature of the request make prior consultation with other agencies undesirable.

## II. PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

*Classification*

### Recommendation 2

That the IAC members discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member.

### Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation if rewritten as indicated.

*Concurrence  
different  
from 1957*

### Comments

This original recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC with respect to the Dulles Report. NSC 50 states that the Director and the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that any one agency can take responsibility for only that portion of a national estimate within the field of its primary interest.

The normal concurrence procedure entails discussion with the IAC agencies and the estimate shows agreement or dissent. It should not always be necessary to discuss a dissent at an IAC meeting, but at the request of a member, such a procedure can be followed.

**SECRET**


## II. PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

### Recommendation 3

That ICAPS review and make recommendations for any revision of procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with the principles outlined in existing NSCID's, NSC 50, and Recommendation 1 above.

### Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation. See comments.



### Comments

If instructed, ICAPS can do this but it is thought that the IAC Members agreed to expedite the "free flow" of information on such matters. It is believed that steps have been taken in the NCE at any rate to supply the Intelligence Chiefs with crisis information so that quick action may be taken by the IAC. Existing procedures under DCI 3/1 could be used for the production of such national estimates if necessary.

Childs is the only one who thinks the present IAC oral agreement to expedite crisis information is adequate. MacCarthy and Zeller think there should be a written agreement on this procedure.

**SECRET**

*Handwritten signature*

### III. RESEARCH AND REPORTS

#### Recommendation 1

That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC.

#### Concurrence

IGAPS does not concur with this recommendation.

*Handwritten notes*

#### Comments

This is too restrictive as the DCI must comply with requests from the President, NSC, etc. The Act says that CIA, under the direction of the NSC, shall perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct. The Act also says that CIA shall "perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." [REDACTED]

FOIAb3b1

FOIAb3b1

[REDACTED] etc., are examples). The Act does not say that the IAC determines this.

**SECRET**

III. RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Recommendation 2

That, on a priority basis, ICAPS prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern.

Concurrence

ICAPS concurs with this recommendation if rewritten as indicated. OKG

Comments

If directed by NSC, CIA can undertake production as well as services in fields of common concern to eliminate duplication among the IAC agencies and to perform mutually useful activities. However, "delineations" is too restrictive in the original recommendation.

It should be determined how extensive must be a "common" interest to establish a field of "common concern."

*Examine  
Security Matter  
As...*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

*Caribbean*

**IV. POLITICAL SUMMARIES**

Recommendation 1

That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly.

Concurrence

ICAPS requests clarification as outlined below.

*similar to  
ORE*

Comments

The CIA Daily and Weekly are covered by paragraph 1, "Current Intelligence," in DCI 3/1, already agreed to by the IAC agencies. Does Mr. Armstrong now wish to change this?

CIA's Daily Summary and Weekly Summary are not exclusively "political" but give world-wide coverage to selected items of current intelligence.

**SECRET**

ICAPS  
position